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ABSTRACT
The process of economic integration has made
considerable progress during the 1990s. in the
European Union (EU). Firstly, with the establishm ent
of a single market in 1993 and now, within a
relatively short period of time, the most significant
yet, the movement towards a single currency for
participating Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
members on 1 Janu ary 1999. This will have a major
impact not only upon participating, and indeed non
participating EU members, but also global financial
markets in general with the establishm ent of a single
currency (the euro) which has the potential to rival
the US dollar as a major international reserve
currency. The paper focuses upon the progress and
potential problems arising from the establishm ent of
EMU in the EU, and in doing so proceeds as follows.
Firstly a brief review of recent developments in the EU
is conducted focusing upon the framework for
establishing EMU, the M aastricht Treaty. Secondly,
economic theory and empirical evidence is analysed
to establish whether the EU satisfies the necessary
conditions for an optimum currency area. Thirdly, the
prospects for
the establishment of EMU on 1
Jan u ary 1999 as well as its prospective members is
identified. Finally, and importantly, the prospective
global economic and financial implications arising
from the establishment of a single currency for the
EMU area is considered.

1. INTRODUCTION
The process of European economic integration has received much
attention in recent years arising from four major developments,
primarily within the context of the European Union (EU). Firstly,
the establishment of a Single European Market (SEM )1 has
contributed to the free movement of labour, capital, goods and
services between member countries arising from the gradual
elimination of non tariff barriers. Secondly, and seen as a logical
extension to reap the benefits of the first, there has been extensive
movement towards the establishment of Economic and Monetary
Union (EM U)2 between EU member countries with the intended
irrevocable fixing of exchange rates, the eventual replacement of
national currencies by a single European currency, and the
establishment of a supranational European Central Bank (ECB)
responsible for the conduct of European monetary policy. Thirdly,
the prospective enlargement of the EU with membership from the
former centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern
Europe3 and the republics of the former Soviet Union and,
perhaps, eventually Russia itself. Finally, in Western Europe,
m ost members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
reached agreement with the EU to form a European Economic
Area (EEA) on 1 January 1994. The EEA allows for the creation
of an area of free trade for goods, services, labour and capital
between the member states of the EU and members of EFTA.
This paper focuses upon the progress and problems arising
from the attainment of a crucial component of further integration
From 1 January 1993. In reality the implementation of laws to achieve this
across individual member countries has extended beyond this date.
The final stage o f EM U is to begin at the latest on 1 January 1999.
By 1997 the EU had received membership applications from ten Central
and Eastern European countries - Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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of the European economy, specifically that of EMU in 1999. It is
clear that if the full benefits of the single market are to be
achieved, and, indeed, for the further enlargement of the EU to
take place, this will crucially depend upon the successful
attainment of monetary union. The paper proceeds as follows. In
section 2 a brief review of recent developments in the EU is
conducted focusing upon that of the M aastricht Treaty, which
provides the framework for economic and monetary union.
Section 3 conducts a theoretical and empirical review of the EU
as an optimum currency area. Section 4 analyses the prospects for
EMU in 1999 identifying in particular its prospective membership
from the countries of the EU. Section 5 identifies important
international economic implications arising from the establishment
of a single currency for the EMU area. Finally section 6 presents a
summary of the major conclusions to be derived from this paper.

2. THE MAASTRICHT TREATY AND ECONOMIC AND
MONETARY UNION

Economic and monetary union has long been an aspiration of the
European Community. In 1970 the Werner Plan proposed a
decade long transition to a single currency by 1980. At this time
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, which pegged
the currencies of the major industrial countries to the dollar, was
still in place. The relative fixity of exchange rates gave plausibility
to the plan for a single currency within the Community, but the
proposal came towards the end of the Bretton Woods era at a
time when rising worldwide inflation and the greatly increasing
mobility of international capital were making it increasingly
difficult for governments to maintain fixed parities. Within two
years of the publication of the Werner Plan, the Bretton Woods
system had collapsed, and exchange rates started to fluctuate
markedly against each other. The European Community (EC)

2

attempted to create a zone of fixed intra European parities,
leaving each currency to float against outside currencies such as
the dollar and the yen. This European currency "snake” was a
precursor of the European Monetary System that followed in
1979. It quickly failed and thoughts of monetary union were set
aside as inflation took off in the industrial countries following
OPEC's decision to raise the price of oil in 1973-74. The resulting
differences in inflation among European countries made plans for
monetary union implausible.
In 1979, after nearly a decade of exchange rate turbulence, the
Community launched the European Monetary System, which w as
intended to make Europe a zone of exchange rate stability. By the
end of the 1980s the EMS was regarded as a proven success,
leading many to believe that the system should be developed
further. Jacques Delors, the then President of the European
Commission,

produced

in 1989

the

Delors

report,

which

proposed once more that the EC move in stages to monetary
union. This later became enshrined in the M aastricht Treaty.
However during the foreign exchange crisis of September 1992
and July 1993, when the UK and Italy were forced out of the
system as a result of speculative attacks, it seemed that once
again EMU had fallen victim to financial market speculation and
exchange rate instability. However this did not deter members of
the EU from continuing the process towards EMU.
The M aastricht Treaty
At the Maastricht summit in December 1991 the heads of state or
government of the EU agreed on far reaching proposals for the
transition to a single currency (to be later called the euro) and the
establishment of a European System of Central Banks. In addition
to the agreement on EMU the summit also agreed on a treaty that:
formally established the European Union; committed the EU
3

members to strive for closer cooperation on foreign and security
policy; and slightly expanded the powers of the European
Parliament. The member states, with the exception of the UK,
also agreed to work toward minimum requirements for social
policies outside the treaty framework.4 The monetary union was
to be reached in three stages as outlined in the report of the
Delors Committee issued in April 1989. During Stage I which
began on July 1,1990 all EU countries were: to join the European
Monetary System; the single market was to be completed; there
was to be closer economic cooperation and a strengthening of
competition policies. In Stage II which began on 1 January 1994
member countries endeavoured to achieve greater convergence of
their economies as measured by four criteria: inflation; long term
interest rates; exchange rate stability; and sustainability of the
fiscal position. At the beginning of this stage a new institution the
European Monetary Institute (EMI) was established, replacing the
Committee of Central Bank Governors. The EMI is directed and
managed by a Council consisting of the governors of the central
banks of the member states and a President appointed by the
European Council. Although the EMI is not responsible for
monetary policy it provides a forum for strengthening the
coordination of monetary policies of the member states. The EMI
also promotes greater cooperation in all aspects of central bank
policy; facilitates the use of the ECU5 and oversees the smooth
functioning of the ECU clearing system; prepares the instruments
and procedures necessary for carrying out a single monetary
policy in the third stage; and supervises the technical preparation
of the euro bank notes. The European Monetary Institute is
effectively the forerunner of the ECB.

4
5

Referred to as the Social Chapter. The UK later joined in May 1997 under
the new Labour Government.
European currency unit.

4

At the start of Stage III, which could begin as early as 1997 but
no later than 1 January 1999, member states which satisfied the
convergence criteria would participate in the final stage, and
would irrevocably fix their exchange rates (no bands) and
subsequently introduce a single currency. Other members would
join once their economies were found to meet the necessary
conditions (a multi-track system was envisaged). The UK and
Denmark, however, retained the right not to join the monetary
union. The EMI will be replaced by a European Central Bank
(ECB) which, together with the central banks of the member
states, will form the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).
The basic tasks of the ESCB will be to formulate and implement
the monetary policy of the Community; conduct foreign exchange
operations; hold and manage the official reserves of the member
states; and promote the smooth operation of the payments
systems. The ECB would be totally independent and have full
power to control EU monetary policy, with national central banks
becoming, in effect, branch offices of the ECB. The EU Council of
Finance Ministers (Ecofin) would decide exchange rate policy,
leading to potential conflict with the ECB. In the area of fiscal
policy the EU would be required to limit members' budget deficits,
hence the subsequent agreement on a stability and growth pact.
The M aastricht Treaty firmly established that the primary
objective of monetary and exchange rate policy 'shall be to
maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this objective,
to support the general economic policies in the Community, in
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with
free competition'. In support of the price stability objective, the
member states in avoiding excessive budget deficits agreed to
eliminate central bank financing of public expenditure by the
beginning of Stage II. They also agreed to make their central banks
independent of governments by the beginning of Stage III. Once a
single currency has been adopted the participating member states
5

are obliged to continue to avoid excessive budget deficits.
Procedures were agreed upon that would allow the Council of
Ministers to take measures against a member state which failed to
comply with a Council decision that its deficit must be reduced.
This was to be furthered clarified at the Dublin summit in
December 1996, and is discussed in more detail below.
For each country the economic conditions for participation in
the monetary union and adoption of the euro are expressed in
quantitative, and nominal, terms for a range of indicators:
•

consumer price inflation in the year prior to examination
by the European Council must not exceed by more than
1.5 percentage points the average for the three member
countries with the lowest inflation rates;

•

interest rates on long term government securities must not
be more than 2 percentage points higher than those in
the same three member states;

•

the currency must have been held within the narrow
band of the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS for
two years without a realignment at the initiation of the
member state in question;

•

a sustainable financial position must be attained. This is
defined as a general government financial deficit no
greater than 3 percent of GDP and a ratio of public
debt to GDP of no more than 60 percent.
In the evaluation of progress toward the economic convergence
criteria the treaty allows for a degree of discretion. In particular, it
requires a substantial and continuous decline of fiscal deficits
toward the reference value, while the debt ratio must be
approaching the benchmark at a "satisfactory pace". The final
judgement on whether a member state meets the economic criteria
was to be made by one or more summits of EU heads of state or
government. The first of these was held in 1996 and had to decide
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as a precondition for EMU to begin in 1997 whether a majority of
countries had achieved economic convergence. Since this was not
the case an additional summit will be held in April 1998 to
determine which, if any, member states satisfy the convergence
criteria based predominantly on member country performance in
1997. Stage III in any event will begin I January 1999 at the latest.
In coming to a decision the summit will also take into account
other indicators of economic performance such as: unit labour
costs; the current account of the balance of payments; and the
integration of markets.
The advocates of a single currency advance the following
arguments: EMU would eliminate the cost of foreign exchange
transactions and exchange rate hedging (estimated to be some
U S$30 billion a year); it would help to stabilise international
currency markets; the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty
would enhance the efficiency of the price mechanism as a resource
allocator; the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty would
stimulate the manufacturing sectors of member countries since
unpredictable and volatile exchange rates are an incentive for
resources to be shifted toward the non traded goods sector which
is not exposed to international competition and is largely
unaffected by sizeable and unanticipated exchange rate changes;
the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty would stimulate
competitive forces in the union and yield benefits in terms of
higher growth rates of intra union trade and investment; the
independence of the ECB in the conduct of European monetary
policy with its primary objective of price stability, will result in
German style lower inflation and contribute to lower interest
rates. The latter will have particular benefits for member countries
that traditionally have had higher inflation.
However, there are a number of serious counter arguments
including: the beneficial effect on transactions costs are
exaggerated; the single market would be best improved by
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liberalising Europe's energy and telecom industries and ensuring
open public sector procurement policies; EMU will mean a loss of
sovereignty since monetary policy would be set by a
supranational European central bank, and governments would
lose the ability to devalue their way out of a crisis; monetary
policy will have a differential impact across member states
resulting in stronger economic cycles in some countries in
comparison to others; EMU will ease the market constraints on
profligate governments resulting in excessive borrowing and an
EMU "debt trap"; in a monetary union uncompetitive labour costs
could no longer be offset by a falling exchange rate, instead
workers would lose their jobs and be required to move elsewhere
or have to accept lower wages. This would further exacerbate
regional income disparities, and skill shortages in relatively poorer
regions; it will result in a two track EU which will exacerbate
differences between those members who participate in EMU from
the beginning from those which initially fail to satisfy the
convergence criteria. The latter development could fundamentally
undermine the achievements of the single market, and prevent the
further enlargement of the EU.
In the following section key theoretical conditions for an
optimum currency area are considered, as well as a review of the
empirical literature relating to whether the EU satisfies such
conditions.
3. THE E U AS AN OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA - THEORY AND
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

The theoretical basis of the Maastricht convergence criteria has
been questioned by economists, both in terms of the choice of
criteria, which emphasise essentially nominal monetary and fiscal
factors, as well as the reasons for the limit and band widths of
the criteria. Given the diversity of opinion over the future role of
8

the EU which was apparent at Maastricht, it can be argued that
the convergence criteria and the limits set for them were based on
political compromise and not on sound economic principles.
However, calls for the inclusion of real convergence criteria have
been made with the most vocal that from the British government
in the spring of 1995, which argued for the fulfilment of real
economic convergence criteria in addition to the four monetary
and fiscal criteria already laid down. This view has support from
the M aastricht Treaty itself where the first paragraph of Article
109j requires that "the results of the integration of markets, the
situation and development of the balances of payments on
current account and an examination of the development of unit
labour costs and other price indexes" be taken into account when
assessing progress towards convergence. The British government
amongst others viewed the Maastricht monetary and fiscal
criteria "as a necessary but not a sufficient condition to justify a
single currency".6
Optimum currency area theory
Attempts to put the British demand for structural convergence
into practice largely failed although the question still remained as
to the theoretical justification for making real economic
convergence a requirement for membership of the EMU. In this
regard the theory of optimum currency areas provides a
framework for comparing the economic costs of flexible and fixed
exchange rate systems. The main cost factor in a system of fixed
exchange rates is the inability to adjust the exchange rate to
shocks, and the level of associated costs depends upon the
availability of alternative adjustment mechanisms. This in turn
suggests that to make countries conducive to membership of a
Former British Prime Minister John Major in a speech delivered on 3
February, 1995.
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monetary union requires the existence of certain characteristics to
minimise the associated costs. Figure I provides a summary of
these key characteristics, or conditions, which make monetary
union more, or less, likely.
An exogenous shock which has symmetrical effects upon
member countries suggests that such members are conducive to
the formation of a monetary union. Alternatively, if the shocks do
not have a symmetrical effect upon members it is essential to
identify whether the causes of this can be reduced. In this regard a
number of factors can be identified as producing asymmetrical
effects: immobility of factors of production - countries with a
high degree of factor mobility are more likely to be suitable
candidates for monetary integration since such factor mobility can
substitute for exchange rate flexibility in the international
adjustment to shocks; wage and price flexibility- wage and price
flexibility facilitates adjustment to adverse exogenous shocks and
reduces the detrimental effects on unemployment and inflation.
Hence countries with more flexible labour markets are more
suitable members of a monetary union; fiscal integration budgetary transfer payments between two countries can help
reduce the negative effects of shocks on real economic activity.
Currency areas are therefore optimum if there is also a willingness
to undergo fiscal integration and hence to enter into an economic
union in general; high degree of economic openness - open
economies tend to be suited to systems of fixed exchange rates as
exchange rate movements have relatively weaker effects on real
competitiveness. This criterion suggests that smaller countries are
better suited to monetary union than large countries;
diversification of production structures - diversified economies
are regarded as better candidates for monetary union as a high
level of diversification offers protection against the effect of
shocks specific to particular sectors; similarity of production
structures - terms of trade shocks have a symmetrical impact in
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countries with similar production structures so that the exchange
rate is redundant as an adjustment instrument. Therefore
countries with similar production structures are better candidates
for monetary union; similar inflation rates - if inflation rates are
similar a smooth flow of current account transactions can be
expected. Consequently, monetary unions are optimum if the
inflation rates in member states are similar; volatility of real
exchange rates - as the previous conditions are difficult to
quantify it has been suggested that the volatility of real exchange
rates should be used as an all embracing criterion for admission to
a monetary union. The smaller real exchange rate fluctuations
have been in the past the better suited a country is for
membership of a monetary union; political factors - the political
desire for monetary integration is emphasised as a deciding factor
for the success of a monetary union.
Countries contemplating the establishment of a monetary
union, and therefore a fixed exchange rate between them, will find
that this is optimum where the structure of their economies is
similar, and if markets in goods and factors of production react
flexibly to real economic changes. Moves towards far reaching
integration should therefore be undertaken only if the real
economies of participating countries react to changes with similar
rapidity and

flexibility, and if both the geographical and

occupational mobility of labour is high. Otherwise shocks will
have a strongly asymmetrical regional impact. Such criteria
identified from economic theory focuses upon real rather than
nominal convergence criteria for the attainment of an optimum
currency area. This contrasts starkly with the nominal
convergence criteria identified under the Maastricht Treaty. Hence
there is a strong theoretical basis for suggesting the inclusion of
real economic convergence criteria as a means of identifying the
readiness of member countries for the formation of a monetary
union.
11

O f particular concern regarding the non inclusion of real
criteria is that if such real convergence is not taking place, and if
economic and monetary union prevents individual regions
(countries) from taking specific economic measures in response to
shocks, there is the likelihood of major regional differences in
terms of unemployment, incomes and growth. As Figure I
suggests, as long as economic shocks affect different countries
differently and as long as sectoral regional labour and/or capital
mobility are low an optimum currency area cannot be achieved.
Should such a monetary union still be formed it is likely to lead to
significant
regional
unemployment
differences,
obvious
international income disparities (core-periphery effects), with the
increased likelihood of social and political tension. In addition
growth theory would suggest that wide regional inequalities can
lead to a reduction in overall long term economic growth.
Empirical evidence
A brief review of the empirical evidence relating to the EU as an
optimum currency area is now conducted as well as the
identification of evidence in regard to the extent of labour
mobility and flexibility in the EU. Table 1 summarises the results
obtained from a number of empirical studies relating to whether
the EU constitutes an optimum currency area on the basis of real
convergence criteria. Overall the results are mixed, and depend
upon the reference variable chosen. Poloz (1990) compares the
adjustment of real exchange rates between the regions of Canada,
as an existing monetary union, with the adjustment in the EU
countries and finds lower real exchange rate volatility in the EU
countries. He therefore concludes that a monetary union in Europe
would not entail higher costs than in Canada. Neumann and von
Hagen (1994) carried out a corresponding analysis for the regions
of Germany, and they come to the conclusion that a monetary
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union would be possible for a core group of countries (Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands).
While a monetary union comprising all EU countries would entail
high costs. A study conducted by De Grauwe and Heens (1993)
reached a similar conclusion.
Figure 1
A Theoretical Flowchart of the Concept of
Optimum Currency Areas
Are shocks Symmetrical? ■

Yes

No

Monetary union!

No monetary union!

Source: F. Heinemann: Central Europe and European Monetary
Integration, in Intereconomics, Vol. 30
p. 119.
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(1995),

No.

3,

Table 1
Is the EU an Optimum Currency Area?

Author (year of
publication)

Is the
EUan
optimum
currency area?

Indicator

Reference
variable

D Cohen,
Wyplosz (1989)

Symmetricalasymmetrical
shocks

.

S Poloz (1990)

Real exchange
rate variability

Regions of
Canada

Yes

B Eichengreen (1992)

- Real exchange
rate variability
- Labour mobility
- Relative share
prices

USA, Canada

No

EC Commission (1990)

Macro-econometric
simulations

-

Yes

P De Grauwe
W van
Haverbecke (1993)

Real exchange
rate variability

Regions of:
Germany
Netherlands
Spain
United Kingdom

T Bayoumi
B Eichengreen (1993)

Shocks (vector auto
regression, VAR)

Regions of USA

No

L Bini-Smaghi
E Vori (1992)

Shocks (VAR)

Regions of USA

Yes

P De Grauwe
H Heens (1993)

Real exchange rate
variability

Regions of:
No
- Germany
- Netherlands
- Spain
- United Kingdom

M J M Neumann
J von Hagen (1994)

Real exchange rate
variability

Regions of
Germany

H Erkel-Rousse
J Melitz (1995)

Shocks

Source:

No

Yes

C. Schmidt and T. Straubhaar (1995), 'Maastricht 11: Are Real Convergence
Criteria Needed?' in Intereconomics, Sept/Oct, p. 218.
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Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) compare the correlation of
shocks to aggregate demand and supply in twelve EU countries
and eight regions of the USA. They estimate that shocks in the EU
countries are less highly correlated, and that accordingly
monetary union in Europe would result in relatively high economic
costs. On the other hand a monetary union in a core group of
countries would give rise to costs comparable to those in the
regions of the USA. Bini-Smaghi and Vori (1992) consider that the
structure of production in EU countries is more diversified than in
the regions of the USA so that asymmetrical shocks are less likely
to occur in Europe than in the USA. This finding is confirmed by
Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) who show that Germany and France
are primarily influenced by symmetrical permanent shocks. A
monetary union between these two countries would therefore be
feasible. Eichengreen (1992) examines various indicators for a
monetary union - real exchange rate variability, labour mobility,
relative share prices - and compares the European performance
with that of the USA and Canada. According to his findings a
monetary union in Europe would entail higher costs than in the
existing monetary unions in the USA and Canada. De Grauwe
and van Haverbecke (1993) compare the adjustment mechanism
at the regional level with that at the national level in a number of
EU countries, and find that labour mobility plays an important
role at the regional level whereas at the national level adjustment
occurs mainly via changes in real exchange rates. They argue that
a monetary union in Europe would have to be accompanied by
increased labour mobility. In the absence of such mobility a
monetary union would be in danger of triggering polarisation
tendencies.
H. Erkel-Rousse and J. Melitz (1995) apply a structural VAR
approach to data for six European countries (France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom). First they
find that the correlation of shocks across countries is very low.
15

This finding is in line with other empirical evidence indicating the
empirical relevance of asymmetric shocks. Secondly, they analyse
the importance of fiscal and monetary policies as a measure of
response to asymmetric shocks. They find, first, that fiscal
policies contribute significantly to output performance in all
countries except Germany. Second, and of particular interest, they
find that monetary policies do not contribute significantly to
output performance except in Germany. This latter result
indicates that monetary policy in these countries has no value as
a stabilisation device and implies that the adoption of a common
currency for those countries would impose much lower economic
costs than previously believed. This work suggests that the mere
existence of asymmetric shocks is not a sufficient argument
against a currency union, because monetary policy may not after
all be a useful tool for response to such shocks.
Regional labour mobility and flexible labour markets are
important to the efficiency of a monetary union. Fatas and
Decressin (1995) analyse the mechanism for adjustment to
changes in the demand for labour across European regions.
According to their findings, changes in labour demand in Europe
are not offset by labour mobility across regions, as in the USA,
but mainly by an age or gender specific decline in labour
participation rates. On the other hand Eichengreen (1993)
examined regional unemployment in England and Italy and
showed that adjustment to changes in relative price occurs in
much the same w ay as in the regions of the USA. Schmidt and
Straubhaar (1995) conduct an analysis of the coefficients of
variation of unemployment rates for various groupings of EU
countries since 1969 which are shown to be significant and barely
to have declined over the period studied and suggestive of low
labour mobility in the EU.
Finally, Heinemann (1995) focuses on the issue of the degree of
cyclical correlation between the economies of Europe. For a
16

successful European monetary union it is helpful if potential
members of the common currency area have a high degree of
cyclical correlation. Germany is taken as the reference economy.
His results indicate, in particular, a core of economies around
Germany: France, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, which
are not only cyclically close to Germany but have also a similar
order of magnitude of cyclical fluctuation. He concludes from this
analysis that these economies appear to be ideal candidates for
the formation of a monetary union.
4. PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN
1999
At an intergovernmental summit to be held in April 1998 the
member nations of the EU will be required to determine, on the
basis of a qualified majority, those member countries which
satisfy the Maastricht criteria, and can therefore proceed to form
an economic and monetary union. This will be based primarily on
their performance in 1997 but will also consider prospective
developments in 1998 and subsequently. This section identifies
the prospects of EMU amongst these members. In doing so it
reviews the recent performance of these countries focusing upon
the key criteria of inflation, long term interest rates, general
government budgetary position and general government gross
debt.
Convergence of price stability
Table 2 summarises the inflation performance of EU members
covering the period 1991-97 as well as the reference value below
which EMU participating economies would be required to satisfy.
This is based on the arithmetic average inflation rate of the three
best performing countries plus 1.5 percentage points. The average
17

of the three best performing countries it is argued can provide a
good starting point for the assessment of compliance with the
reference value if there are no outliers. It is noticeable from this
table that major success has been achieved in reducing CPI
inflation in the EU countries since 1991, and particularly so in
countries such as Greece, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. In
addition this reduction in inflation has occurred in conjunction
with a convergence of inflation rates across member states. A
number of underlying factors can be identified as having
contributed to this overall trend. Firstly there has been a move
among member countries to orient their monetary policies
increasingly towards the objective of price stability, and towards
central bank independence. Secondly, increased competition has
arisen from the development of the single market as well as
globally. Thirdly, labour market reforms in some countries as well
as the recession of the early 1990s contributed to an easing of
price and cost pressures. Fourthly, Maastricht criteria pressures
to attain a fiscally sustainable policy focused upon the need to
reduce fiscal deficits and debt ratios which is conducive to the
maintenance of price stability over the longer term. Finally, the
liberalisation of domestic and international financial markets has
also contributed towards price stability.
From Table 2 it can be observed that by 1996 four countries Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal did not satisfy the Maastricht
inflation criteria. However the key performance year will be that
of 1997. Forecasts for the inflation performance of EU members
for 1997 are also contained in Table 2, based upon those of the
European Commission and the Economist Intelligence Unit. Both
are in agreement that most countries will satisfy the criteria or
reference value in 1997 with the exception of Greece.
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Convergence of long-term interest rates
Long-term interest rate developments for the EU countries over
the period 1991-97 are contained in Table 3. This shows ten year
government bond yields for each country as well as the
M aastricht reference value for each year for this variable. Over
this period there has been a general decline in the reference value
for the long term interest rate. In 1996 only three countries, Greece,
Italy and Portugal, failed to have a long term interest rate below
the reference value. In general these countries failed to satisfy the
reference value throughout the period identified. Forecasts for
1997 are provided from the European Commission, the OECD
and the Economist Intelligence Unit.
Table 3 suggests that there has been a clear process of
convergence of long term interest rates across EU countries over
the period identified with a noticeable decline over the period
1991-96. This is anticipated to continue during 1997. This general
downward trend was only interrupted in 1994 when rising yields
on the US market resulted in a comparable steep rise in long term
interest rates in the EU. A combination of factors appears to have
accounted for this general downward trend. In some countries
inflation expectations appear to have decreased while an
important role also seems to have been played by a reduction in
risk premia. The decrease in risk premia may be attributed to a
change in financial markets' perceptions of longer term progress
towards price stability, related factors such as ongoing efforts
towards fiscal consolidation, the stability of exchange rates and a
decrease in political uncertainty. Improved expectations regarding
prospects for monetary union has also played a role. For
individual countries, the outturns may be interpreted as an
indication that markets anticipate broadly similar macroeconomic
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developments in those member states showing no or only very
small differences in long term interest rates. This is particularly
the case for Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and Austria. In countries whose rates remain above
the reference value namely Greece, Italy, Portugal and possibly
Spain, although a significant convergence of yields has occurred,
differentials still remain wide which indicates that progress
towards overall convergence needs to be strengthened. However,
more recently a general acceleration of the convergence of long
term interest rates has been observed. This has been particularly
the case in those countries whose long term interest rates stand
above the reference value during the year 1996. For 1997 country
specific factors - such as inflation expectations and changing risk
premia, and thereby issues related to sustainabiltiy as well as
prospects relating to EMU will play an important role.
The European Commission predicts that Greece, Spain, Italy
and Portugal will be unable to achieve the reference value in 1997,
however the EIU is more optimistic forecasting that only Greece
and Italy will fail to meet the anticipated reference value of 8.5%.
The OECD forecast is incomplete but tends to take a more
optimistic view of prospective developments in 1997.
Financial sustainability
In terms of attaining the Maastricht criteria it is particularly in
regard to the attainment of fiscal sustainability that major
difficulties are arising.7 From the early 1990s there was a
substantial deterioration in the public finances of nearly all of the
EU countries. As a result the average fiscal deficit for the EU as a
whole widened rapidly from 2.4% of GDP in 1989 to a high of
7

A recent formalisation by EU members to sustain efforts towards fiscal
consolidation was made in the form of a "Stability and Growth Pact" in
December 1996 at the Dublin Summit.
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6.2% in 1993. At that point in time most countries faced major
challenges in reversing what was an unsustainable trend.
Responding to this EU member governments have taken intensive
measures in an effort to place their deficits on a downward path.
This has included cuts to welfare and

general government

expenditure. Traditional sizeable welfare state spending in
Europe, the recession of the 1980s and 1990s, and the high
interest rates following Germany's unification, have increased the
size of government deficits. The cuts in government spending
required to attain the Maastricht fiscal sustainability criteria will
be painful in terms of lost jobs and cuts to welfare expenditure at
a time of already very high rates of unemployment in the EU.
Such problems have recently come to the fore in both France in
1995 and 1997 with the election of a socialist government
committed to the creation of jobs where necessary at the expense
of the criteria on budget deficits and Germany in 1996. In the case
of Germany, for example, its projected unemployment rate of
11.1%8 in 1997 will put intense pressure on government
expenditure and the budget deficit and public sector debt.
Germany's budget deficit in particular is likely to exceed the
M aastricht

criteria

in

1997,

and

particularly

given

the

Bundesbank's rejection of a revaluation of the country's gold
reserves as a means of generating additional government revenue.
Table 4 indicates the nature of the difficulty facing EU
members in regard to the fiscal criteria, specifically in regard to
that of the General Government budget deficit. It is clear from this
table the number of occasions that EU members have failed to
achieve the 3% budget deficit criteria. In 1995, for example, only
Denmark and Ireland achieved a budget deficit of less than 3% of
GDP while Luxembourg achieved a surplus. In eight of the other
countries government imbalances were reduced, and in some cases

OECD, June 1997.
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quite noticeably. However for Germany, Spain, the Netherlands
and Austria the deficit situation worsened. During 1996 only five
countries had deficits less than 3% of GDP or a budget surplus,
namely Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg. All other EU member states achieved a reduction in
budget deficits although most were still well above the reference
value with the exception of Germany which experienced a further
deterioration.
The performance of EU countries in terms of their budgets in
1997, and their ability to sustain this in 1998, will be crucial in the
determination of which countries will form EMU. In this regard
the European Commission takes a very optimistic position in its
latest projections,9 anticipating that only Greece and France will
fail to achieve the reference value for 1997. The most pessimistic
position is taken by the EIU which anticipates that in addition to
these countries Italy, Germany, Portugal, Spain and the UK will
also fail to satisfy the criteria. The OECD takes a more middle
ground anticipating that Greece, Italy, France and Germany will
fail to satisfy the criteria. It is now largely accepted by the
government of France that it will fail to satisfy the criteria, and
the position for Germany, Greece as well as Italy will remain
difficult. A majority view would suggest that these four countries
are most in danger of not satisfying the Maastricht criteria.
However the Treaty does allow for such countries to still comply
if the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and
reached a level that comes close to the reference value, or,
alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only
exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the
reference value. On this basis anticipated outcomes for 1998 will

9

October 1997.
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also be taken into consideration. This being so Italy presents a
major problem according to the EC, and Italy Austria and Greece
according to the OECD.
Table 5 summarises developments over the period 1991-98 in
terms of government debt. Over this period of time it is apparent
that m ost members have failed to achieve the reference value, and
in a number of cases to a significant degree. For several countries
there has over this period been a trend towards high and rising
government debt to GDP ratios, and this persisted through 1995
and 1996. This underlies the pressing need for reinforcing fiscal
consolidation. According to the European Commission's autumn
1996 forecast, EU wide government debt was expected to reach
73.5% of GDP in 1996 which would be almost twice as high as in
1980. A particularly marked increase in this ratio occurred in the
early 1990s under the influence of a vicious circle of ever
increasing debt interest payments, deficits and further debts. The
focus of such a development has shifted towards issues related to
the sustainability of government finances. In this respect the major
emphasis is on future challenges such as the need to reduce
current high debt ratios and to cope with the growing burden of
social security old age pensions. The growing burden of debt
service obligations tends to crowd out non interest expenditures
and makes national government budgets increasingly vulnerable to
exchange rate and interest rate volatility. This is mostly the case
when the debt is at short maturity or is indexed to short term
interest rates.
Only five member states attained a position below the
reference value of 60% of GDP in 1995, namely Germany, France,
Luxembourg, Finland and the UK. Of the ten remaining members
with a debt ratio above the reference value only Ireland and
Denmark achieved a major reduction while Belgium, Italy and
Sweden attained a slight decline. For 1996 the debt ratio fell
slightly for Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden
26

and Italy, but noticeably more so for Belgium and Ireland.
However it increased in Germany, Spain, Austria, France,
Luxembourg, Greece and the UK. In 1996 only four member states
achieved a debt ratio below the 60% reference value, namely
France, Luxembourg Finland and the UK. However the key year
again will be the performance of these countries in 1997, as well
as the anticipated performance in 1998. Projections by the
European Commission, the OECD and the EIU are contained in
Table 5, and do not make optimistic reading. Even for the more
optimistic European Commission, only Finland, France,
Luxembourg and the UK are likely to satisfy the strict reference
value of 60% in 1997. The OECD projections also come to the
same conclusion. In the case of the EIU only France, Luxembourg
and the UK will satisfy the criteria. Projections for 1998 from the
EC would add Ireland to this list. However as w ith the case of
government deficits an EU country can still qualify for
membership of EMU if the ratio of government debt to GDP is
sufficiently dimirushing and approaching the reference value at a
'satisfactory' pace. On this basis a majority view of the three
forecasts would suggest that Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, along with
Finland, France, Luxembourg and the UK would satisfy this
criteria. Only Germany and possibly Austria would have
difficulty in satisfying this criteria. However the EC appears to be
very elastic in interpreting this condition.
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In 1994 only Luxembourg and Germany satisfied the fiscal
convergence criteria in full but by 1995 and 1996 only
Luxembourg did so. The above financial sustainability analysis
suggests that progress towards fiscal consolidation has generally
been very slow. To attain the Maastricht criteria in this regard will
require a faster correction of fiscal imbalances. M ost countries
have not achieved a situation that could be judged as sustainable
in the medium term as indicated by worrisome debt
developments. To produce a virtuous circle of a continuously
diminishing debt ratio the authorities will need to achieve and
maintain a sufficiently high primary surplus. This will require
decisive corrective measures that are primarily directed at cutting
expenditure, which could reward governments with lower interest
rates and thereby reduce the interest payable on government debt.
For countries with a legacy of high debt ratios this implies aiming
for an extended period of overall budget balance or surpluses to
correct earlier fiscal excesses. One off deficit improvement
measures will be insufficient to ensure sustainable consolidation.
The need to sustain such efforts towards consolidation has been
formalised in the form of a "stability and growth pact" among EU
members agreed at the Dublin summit of December 1996, which
would apply in the period after monetary union w as achieved.
Under this arrangement countries that run excessive budget
deficits, in excess of the 3% of GDP convergence criteria under the
M aastricht Treaty, will be subject to fines, unless they experience
a natural disaster or a fall in GDP of a least 2% over a year. In
cases where GDP has fallen between 0.75% and 2% EU Finance
Ministers w ill have discretion as to the imposition of penalties. By
implication those with a fall of GDP by less than 0.75% will
automatically be subject to fines. Such fines would be substantial
amounting to 0.2% of GDP for a breach of the 3% ceiling with a
further 0.1% for each further 1% breach of the ceiling up to a
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maximum of 0.5% of GDP. The scale of these fines, while less
than that originally proposed by Germany, are still substantial.
W hat, then, are the prospects for the complete monetary
integration of the EU. It is difficult to conceive the economic and
political conditions that would enable all EU countries to become
members of the currency union by 1999. Indeed by the end of
1996, in conjunction with the projections for 1997, the prospects
for monetary union among EU members look bleak particularly if
the convergence criteria were to be strictly applied. Without
German and French membership from the outset the process of
attaining monetary union does not look credible. It is clear that a
number of countries would wish to proceed, if possible, with the
full implementation of the M aastricht Treaty. At least France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg would wish
to form a monetary union, and it is also possible to envisage
Ireland and Denmark joining this group of countries. This will
inevitably result in the emergence of a "two-speed" or "multi track"
Europe. However the emergence of a "two-speed" Europe would
not be without cost and would certainly be resisted particularly
by the member countries excluded from moving on the fast lane.
But even this development, based upon the recent performance of
the member states in regard to financial sustainability, may only
be possible if the starting date for EMU is postponed or the
convergence criteria liberally interpreted.
5. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC
AND MONETARY UNION
While the consequences of economic and monetary union has
dominated political and economic debate in Europe over a
number of years, only recently has attention focused upon an
analysis of its global implications (see OECD (1997). The creation
of a single currency in the EU will represent the biggest change in
30

global monetary arrangements since the demise of the Bretton
W oods arrangement of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s.
The extent of its impact on the rest of the world will depend upon
two related issues. Firstly, the extent of the challenge by the euro
to the US dollar as the world's major foreign exchange reserve
currency, and secondly the consequences of EMU upon the
stability of the global monetary system.10 In regard to the former
the potential for the euro to play an important role as an
international unit of account will depend on several factors: the
relative weight in both total global output and trade of the euro
area; the relative stability of domestic prices in the euro area; the
comparative macroeconomic performance of the euro area with
that of other global economic blocs such as Japan and the USA;
the existence of large and liquid euro financial markets; and
exporters' and importers' preferences. While the extent of these
developments is difficult to anticipate they are likely to exert a
major bearing upon the stability of the global monetary system
overall, and are therefore too big to ignore.
Table 6 uses a number of economic indicators to identify the
global significance of the EU, and to compare and contrast its
performance with that of the two other major global economic
blocs, the USA and Japan, during the period of the 1990s. On the
basis of these measures the influence of the European Union is
substantial. The EU single market and currency area, assuming all
EU members participate, will consist of an economy which is
roughly comparable in size to that of the USA based on 1991 PPP
rates, and about 18 per cent larger based on 1996 exchange rates

10

The prospect o f a single currency, however, has not gone unnoticed
amongst foreign multinationals with extensive involvement in Europe.
Toyota, for example, provoked a furore in the UK in January 1997 by
indicating that the company might redirect its European investment to
continental Europe if the UK stayed out of EM U. While Toyota has since
re-affirmed its commitment to the UK, it showed that foreign investment
could be influenced by developments in EMU.
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and prices. It is noticeable that the average performance of these
three major economic blocs differed only slightly during the period
of the 1990s. The average growth rate of GDP in the EU area was
between that of the USA and Japan while inflation w as
noticeably higher in the EU area. It is anticipated that once EMU
is established in the EU, in conjunction with a European Central
Bank having price stability as its primary objective, that this will
lead to convergence of lower inflation in the area. The average
unemployment rate during the period of the 1990s was noticeably
higher in the EU, representing its major economic policy challenge,
arising from structural rigidities in markets, particularly that of
the labour market. Public sector debt in the EU is lower than that
in Japan but higher than that in the USA. Gross national saving is
considerably higher in Japan in comparison to that of the EU and
USA with the EU performance better than that of the USA. A
common characteristic shared by the three economic blocs is that
they are not overly exposed to adverse trade developments, with
their trade balances, either positive or negative, being a small
proportion of overall GDP. Only Japan of the three blocs achieved
an average current account surplus during the period of the 1990s.
These three blocs are, however, major exporters, with the EU,
excluding intra EU trade, being the world's main exporter with a
19% share of world exports compared to a 16% share for the
USA and a 12% share for Japan in 1996 (OECD).
If backed by a credible monetary policy there is the prospect
that the euro will eventually play a more important role than its
constituent European currencies do today. The clear mandate of
the European Central Bank (ECB) to achieve price stability will
contribute considerably to this development. Such a policy
priority will enhance the attractiveness of the euro as a reserve
currency for central banks, and financial markets will be more
willing to conduct transactions in the new currency. Both of these
changes will occur mainly at the expense of the US dollar. The
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extent of initial use of the euro as a reserve currency will depend
upon its perceived strength and stability after its launch. EU
officials have predicted that the euro's anti-inflationary
credentials and the existence of large and liquid euro
denominated markets will make it attractive. While the US dollar
may continue to be the first choice, European currencies will
continue to gain ground. As indicated in Table 7, 71.1% of central
banks' reserves consisted of US dollars in 1983 compared with
61.5% by 1996. The share taken by European currencies increased
from 15.8% to 20.1% over the same period. The euro will improve
further upon these figures should price stability improvements be
anticipated. On the other hand admitting countries that do not
satisfy the EMU convergence criteria, and the likelihood that
"softer" economies will join at the currency's launch, could result
in the emergence of a 'soft' euro. This would make it less
attractive compared to the US dollar and the yen. But there is
major disagreement over how quickly such developments are
likely to occur, and indeed over whether the euro will ultimately
usurp the dollar as the primary reserve currency.
The attractiveness of the euro as an international currency will
also depend on the development of domestic financial markets.
The advent of EMU will initiate significant structural change in
financial markets not least because of the elimination of exchange
rate risk between the participating countries. The extension of the
single market to financial services will also have the effect of
breaking down national barriers and setting in motion competitive
forces that should greatly improve the efficiency of financial
markets. How efficient they become as a result of this process will
have a bearing on the international demand for euros.
The extent of currency instability arising from a portfolio shift
by central banks and investors into euros would depend upon
both the size and speed with which it takes place. A sudden
surge in demand for the euro would cause it to appreciate
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rapidly, and temporarily, above its long run equilibrium level.
Such an overshooting of the currency would result in a loss of
international competitiveness and a deterioration of the EU's
current account deficits, a reduction in real interest rates and a
consequential depreciation of the currency. In addition, policy
decisions within Europe could further exacerbate the volatility of
the euro. For example, EMU governments, having given up the
right to an independent monetary policy, may resort to an
expansionary fiscal policy11 despite the existence of the "stability
and growth pact" designed to avoid this. However the European
Central Bank, concerned with establishing its own credibility in
terms of implementing an anti inflation policy, is likely to
implement a tight monetary policy. Such a combination of policies
is likely to lead to an impact upon the euro similar to that upon
the US dollar in the early 1980s under the Reagan administration.
The euro would as a consequence appreciate strongly as
international investors switched into euro denominated assets
contributing further to global exchange rate volatility. Currency
instability arising from these potential developments could be
mitigated by appropriate action by central banks should they be
the major initiators of a reshuffling of asset portfolios. Such
action would involve a more gradual adjustment of reserves.
However it is likely that temporarily, at least, exchange rate
volatility will increase. This could become permanent arising from
the fact that because trade among EMU members will be
transacted in a common currency, hence international trade will
become smaller, European policy makers may pay less attention
to exchange rates than they now do. This could result in greater
instability.
The pressure to do so may be particularly intense should unemployment be
rising.
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It has been suggested that one way to minimise exchange rate
instability is for a more formal system of currency cooperation
between the world's major economies. However for Europe there
would be uncertainty over who should cooperate. At its start
EMU 'will not include all EU members. The relationship between
the 'ins' and the 'outs' will affect the potential for broader
coordination as well as currency stability within Europe. In
addition the technicalities of policy cooperation will not be easy.
The European Central Bank will control monetary policy, EM U’s
finance ministers will have a say on exchange rate policy, and
fiscal policy will, within limits, stay in the hands of individual
European governments. Policy coordination, at least initially,
would be far from straightforward. That alone may make the
international monetary system less stable.
Once EMU is established, however, the growth in the euro's
role as an international currency is, on balance, likely to be more
gradual. Market participants will want to wait until actual
monetary and fiscal policies are in place and the stability of the
euro is firmly established. Furthermore, inertia will likely work in
favour of a continuation of the dominant role of the dollar for
some time. On the other hand there are factors which suggest that
the US dollar's position is still likely to remain dominant. This
arises partly from the dollar's international attraction due to the
size, depth and liquidity of the US's capital markets. The US's
market for domestic securities, for example, is twice as large as
the combined markets of the EU economies. Despite rapidly
increasing financial integration in Europe the US's supremacy is
unlikely to be realistically challenged. However some economists12
anticipate that between 30% and 40% of global financial assets
will end up denominated in euros, between 40% and 50% in U S
dollars, and the rest in yen and a few other currencies. This
12

F. Bergsten, director, Institute for International Economics, Washington, at
a symposium held by the International Monetary Fund.
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implies a shift of between US$500 billion and US$1 trillion into
euros, primarily out of US dollars, as investors and central banks
reshuffle their portfolios.
Finally, because of its size, fiscal and monetary policies
conducted in the EMU area are likely to have a significant impact
on the macroeconomic environment in the rest of the world. Key
transmission mechanisms from the conduct of macroeconomic
and structural policies in the euro area to the rest of the world
w ill work through exchange rate and interest rate developments.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The European Union has made significant advances towards the
attainment of economic and monetary union. EMU has been set
down for 1 January, 1999 at the latest for those countries that
achieve the Maastricht convergence criteria, although considerable
difficulties exist in terms of achieving the fiscal sustainability
criteria in particular. This involves the attainment of a budget
deficit of less than 3% of GDP and a public sector debt of less
than 60% of GDP. The most likely outcome will be a two track
EM U within the EU, where some members have satisfied the
conditions for EMU while others have not. This could cause major
difficulties for those members excluded from initial membership,
and exacerbate existing differences between them and those
countries included in EMU.
The issue of whether the EU constitutes an optimum currency
area was considered as well as whether there is the need for real
convergence criteria to be satisfied before EMU membership is
finally decided. Optimum currency area theory would suggest
that the use of real convergence criteria to decide membership has
strong foundations. This theory would emphasise the need for a
high degree of mobility of factors of production, a high degree of
economic openness, diversification of production structures and
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similarity of production structures across prospective members.
W ith the exchange rate no longer available to play a key role in
the adjustment to external shocks, greater reliance will be placed
upon price and wage flexibility, mobility of production factors
•and fiscal instruments to reduce regional disparities. Should these
adjustment mechanisms be inoperative or weak there are likely to
be adverse regional differences and social and political tension
arising from asymmetrical shocks which could prove too strong
for the maintenance of the monetary union.
A clear picture does not emerge from recent empirical evidence
as to whether the EU countries constitute an optimum currency
area. However it does tend to show that real convergence is
discernible in a core group of countries around Germany, including
the Benelux countries, France and Austria in particular. In terms
of the cyclical correlation of their economies Denmark, Spain and
Italy also appear to have become closer to this core group of
nations during the 1990s. On the other hand the economies of the
UK, Ireland, Greece, Sweden, Finland and Portugal appear to
have become less integrated with the economies of the core
nations, and for some of these the correlation is actually a
negative one. Hence a distinct core-periphery division appears to
exist making the task of monetary union for the whole of the EU
unlikely at present. Hence a two track Europe is most likely. The
empirical evidence also appears to suggest that there is very low
labour mobility in Europe indicative of segmented labour markets.
High unemployment rates across most of the EU countries is also
indicative of a lack of labour market flexibility. The existence of
such deficiencies in the operation of labour markets in Europe
does not bode well for the prospects of successful monetary
union.
The establishment of a single currency within the EM U area
will have a profound impact not only upon EU participants and
non participants but also for the rest of the world. There is the
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prospect of the establishment of a reserve currency, the euro,
which has the potential to rival that of the US dollar. The size of
the EU economy, its significant role in international trade, the
ECB's commitment to price stability and the potential growth of
euro financial markets suggest that the demand for the euro could
be substantial. This will arise from world central banks
diversifying into the new currency as well as that of private
financial investors, and in the process have important
implications for the volatility of world financial markets and
exchange rates that cannot be ignored.
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